MODERN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES, NARRATIVES AND TOPICS IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN INFORMATION WAR
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59553/2518-7546-2023-21-2Keywords:
war, disinformation, information warfare, information operations, info ops, psy ops, strategic communications, social networks, fake news, fakes, information influence, psychological influence, information communication technologies, national security and defense.Abstract
The article examines the experience of Ukrainian information infiltration into the territory of Russia. It studies the application of the modern information and communication technologies that enable the circumvention of strict censorship regulations in the aggressor country, as well as the various narratives, topics and messages.
After several decades of defending against Russia’s information warfare and Russian information environment Ukraine has managed to develop an efficient strategy to counter Russian propaganda as well as to establish the system for information infiltration into the enemy’s territory and influencing its public consciousness.
In the information warfare against Russia Ukraine enjoys the support of its strategic allies in the form of the so called collective West with its rich experience in countering the USSR during the Cold War period, as well as the ad hoc allies from the ranks of the liberal anti-war opposition in Russia.
The Russians have been provided with access to a variety of alternative information regarding the war. Gradually, this information has been eroding the trust of Russian society in Putin, even among military personnel. It has been fostering a negative attitude towards war as the main cause for many
negative consequences for the nation. Additionally, it has been exploiting the existing interregional and interethnic conflicts as well as devaluing traditional values, which Putin tries to use in an attempt to transform the authoritarian regime into a totalitarian one.
It is evident that the information warfare will last much longer than the conventional one, as Russia is Ukraine’s enemy in the long run. Throughout 2022-23, Ukraine gained vast experience in information operations against the Russian Federation. The significance of these operations will soon increase against the background of the inevitable escalation of Russia’s confrontation not only with Ukraine but also with the collective West.
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